This book traces the development of U.S-led global nuclear non-proliferation diplomacy during the three decades since the Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” in 1953. The U.S. non-proliferation efforts had diverse obstacles. It had to prevent nuclear states’ export of nuclear technology while dissuading non-nuclear states from developing nuclear weapons. In addition, building non-proliferation regime was not always its top foreign policy priority. To understand the complex process of non-proliferation, the book examines the relations among three different actors in the nuclear field: a global non-proliferation regime builder (U.S.), a potential nuclear proliferator (France) and a would-be nuclear state (Republic of Korea). In tracing how they developed nuclear strategies, conflicting and compromising with one another, the book pays special attention to how the transforming Cold War structure in the 1970s not only affected foreign policies of the involved countries but also complicated their relationship. The exploration ultimately highlights the multidimensional nature of international discussion on nuclear non-proliferation as the ROK’s nuclear development attempts, U.S. non-proliferation efforts, and the U.S.-France nuclear technology cooperation in the 1970s were all deeply connected.
Author(s): Lyong Choi, Jooyoung Lee
Publisher: Springer
Year: 2023
Language: English
Pages: 114
City: Singapore
Preface
Acknowledgments
Contents
About the Authors
1 Prologue
Puzzle in the Birth and Demise of the ROK Nuclear Program Behind the U.S.–France Diplomacy Scenes
References
2 The Origin of the ROK Nuclear Program
Designing a Nuclear Weapons Program in the ROK
Atoms for Peace and the Introduction of Nuclear Science in the ROK
Redesigning ROK’s Nuclear Development with Efforts from Technocrats and the Scientific Community in the 1960s
Re-Birth of the Nuclear Weapons Plan
CANDU–NRX Negotiation Between the ROK and Canada
The ROK–French Negotiations for Reprocessing Facilities
References
3 The U.S. and the Emerging Threat of Proliferation: Opportunities and Risks for the Non-proliferation Regimes Created in the Changing Context of the Cold War Order, 1960–1974
Intrinsic Problems of the Atoms for Peace Program
The Kennedy–Johnson Era: Stabilizing the Superpower Nuclear Game and Road to Non-proliferation Treaty
The Kennedy Era: Tightening the Non-proliferation Policy
The Johnson Era: The U.S.–Soviet Union Agreement on the NPT and the U.S.–France Split
Johnson’s Failure to Stabilize East Asia: Rebirth of the Nuclear Weapons Program in the ROK
The Nixon Era
Strategic Shift from Confrontation to Cooperation: Nixon–Pompidou Talks for Strategic Nuclear Cooperation
Deepening Alliance Dilemma in East Asia: The Nixon Doctrine and Rebirth of the Nuclear Weapons Program in the ROK
Conclusion
References
4 The Rise and Downfall of Gaullism and France’s Nuclear Deals with Third World States, 1945–1974
Rise of Technonationalism in Post-war France and Turmoil in the U.S.–France Relations
The Impact of Changes in Domestic Politics and Franco–U.S. Strategic Nuclear Talks on France’s Nuclear Export Policy
The France–U.S. Strategic Nuclear Talks (1969–1974)
France–Pakistan Nuclear Cooperation and Deal for the Nuclear Reprocessing Plant (RPP)
France–Iran Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (1974)
France–ROK Reprocessing and Ballistic Missile Deal (1974)
References
5 The Coexistence of the ROK–France–IAEA Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and the ROK–U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, 1975
The ROK–U.S. Alliance Dilemma and Nuclear Diplomacy After the Indian Nuclear Test
Construction of Non-Proliferation Coalition: The U.S.–France Talks for Strategic Nuclear Cooperation and Building of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
Conclusion
References
6 The Fall of the Gaullist Technocrats and End of the ROK Nuclear Weapons Program, 1976–1979
The ROK-U.S. Nuclear Committee Talks and Inter-Korean Military Conflict
The Fall of the Gaullists and the CEA Setback
ROK Missile Development, 1971–1976
The Rise of Jimmy Carter and the ROK Nuclear-Hedging Strategy
The Carter-Park Conflict and Cooperation Between Carter and d’Estaing: the Missile Showdown and the Indigenous Nuclear Program, 1977–1978
The Summit Meeting, End of the U.S. Pullout Plan, ROK–U.S. Missile Guidelines, and the End of the ROK Nuclear Weapons Program Following Park’s Demise, 1979–1980
Conclusion
References
Epilogue
Nuclear Latency and Hedging Issue in the ROK
Political Discussion of ROK Nuclear Latency in the 2010s and 2020s
Conclusion
References
