This work investigates intuitions' nature, demonstrating how philosophers can best use them in epistemology. First, the author considers several paradigmatic thought experiments in epistemology that depict the appeal to intuition. He then argues that the nature of thought experiment-generated intuitions is not best explained by an a priori Platonism. Second, the book instead develops and argues for a thin conception of epistemic intuitions. The account maintains that intuition is neither a priori nor a posteriori but multi-dimensional. It is an intentional but non-propositional mental state that is also non-conceptual and non-phenomenal in nature. Moreover, this state is individuated by its progenitor, namely, the relevant thought experiment. Third, the author provides an argument for the evidential status of intuitions based on the correct account of the nature of epistemic intuition. The suggestion is the fitting-ness approach: intuition alone has no epistemic status. Rather, intuition has evidentiary value as long as it fits well with other pieces into a whole, namely, the pertinent thought experiment. Finally, the book addresses the key challenges raised by supporters of anti-centrality, according to which philosophers do not regard intuition as central evidence in philosophy. To that end, the author responds to them, showing that they fail to affect the account of intuition developed in this book. This text appeals to students and researchers working in epistemology.
Author(s): Manhal Hamdo
Series: Philosophical Studies Series, 150
Publisher: Springer
Year: 2023
Language: English
Pages: 191
City: Berlin
Introduction
Acknowledgments
Abstract
Contents
Chapter 1: Epistemic Thought Experiment and Intuition
1.1 Introduction
1.2 The Emergence of Thought Experiments in Philosophy
1.3 Thought Experiments in Epistemology
1.3.1 Thought Experiment in Classical Epistemology
1.3.1.1 Plato’s Theaetetus Case
1.3.1.2 Descartes’ Dreamer Case
1.3.1.3 Husserl’s Honeysuckle Case
1.3.2 Thought Experiment in Contemporary Epistemology
1.3.2.1 Jackson’s Fred Case
1.3.2.2 Jackson’s Mary Case
1.3.2.3 Searle’s Chinese Room Case
1.3.2.4 Chalmers’ Zombie Case
1.3.2.5 Cohen’s Lottery Cases
1.3.2.6 Lehrer’s Truetemp Case
1.3.2.7 Goldman’s Fake Barn Case
1.3.2.8 Gettier’s Cases
1.3.2.9 Kripke’s Gödel–Schmidt Case
1.3.2.10 BonJour’s Example of Norman the Clairvoyant
1.4 Commentaries on Thought Experiments in Epistemology
1.4.1 Characterizations of Thought Experiment and Their Epistemic Function
1.4.2 The Structures of Thought Experiment and Their Epistemic Function
1.5 Intuition in Epistemology
1.5.1 Epistemic Intuition in Classical Epistemology
1.5.2 Epistemic Intuition in Contemporary Epistemology
1.5.2.1 Intuition in some Intuition-Theorists’ Accounts
1.5.2.1.1 Chudnoff’s Phenomenology-Based View
1.5.2.1.2 Sosa’s Competence-Based View
1.5.2.1.3 Bealer’s Sui Generis Mental State-Based View
1.6 Mathematical Platonism
1.7 Epistemology without Intuition
1.8 Concluding Remarks
Chapter 2: The Nature of Epistemic Intuition
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Intuition as Mental State
2.2.1 Bealer’s Intellectual Seeming Analysis
2.2.2 Sosa’s Understanding Analysis
2.2.3 Chudnoff’s Intellectual Perception Analysis
2.3 Ascriptions of Intuition
2.3.1 Intuition and the A Priori
2.3.1.1 The Experimental Approach
2.3.1.2 Peacemaking Attempts
2.3.1.2.1 Conciliatory Argument
2.3.1.2.2 Anti- skepticism Argument
2.3.1.2.3 Argument from Anti- A Priori–A Posteriori Distinction
2.3.1.2.4 Argument from the A Priori-Naturalism Compatibility
2.3.1.3 Two Possible Responses
2.3.1.3.1 Against the Number Sequence Argument
2.3.1.3.2 Against the Argument from Concepts
2.3.1.4 Intuition and Multi-dimensionality
2.3.2 Non-propositional Intuition
2.3.3 Non-phenomenal Intuition
2.4 The Individuation of Intuition
2.5 Concluding Remarks
Chapter 3: The Epistemic Status of Intuitions
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Reliabilism About Intuition
3.2.1 Bealer on Modal Reliabilism
3.2.2 Sosa on the Competence-Based View
3.2.3 Chudnoff on Phenomenal Dogmatism
3.3 The Challenges of Experimentalism
3.3.1 The Variation Argument
3.3.2 The Calibration Argument
3.4 Perspectival Relativism About Intuition
3.5 The Desiderata for an Account of the Epistemic Status of Intuition
3.5.1 Intuition Appears to Be a Crucial Part of the Relevant Thought Experiment
3.5.2 Thought Experiments Offer an Epistemic Argument
3.5.3 Evaluating Logical Argument
3.5.4 Evaluating Epistemic Argument
3.5.5 Justifiedness and the Challenge of Disagreement
3.6 Concluding Remarks
Chapter 4: Epistemic Intuition in Light of Intuition-Deniers
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Revisiting the Accounts of Intuition-Deniers
4.2.1 Cappelen’s Thesis of Anti-centrality
4.2.2 Williamson’s View of Intuition as a Counterfactual Conditional
4.2.3 Deutsch’s Debunking the Myth of Intuition
4.3 The Three Major Intuition-Rejecting Arguments
4.3.1 The Argument from Lacking Reference
4.3.2 The Argument from Depsychologizing the Philosophical Evidence
4.3.3 The Argument from Argumentationalism
4.4 Replying to the Three Major Intuition-Rejecting Arguments
4.4.1 Reply to the Argument from Lacking Reference
4.4.2 Reply to the Argument from Depsychologizing the Philosophical Evidence
4.4.3 Reply to the Argument from Argumentationalism
4.4.3.1 Cappelen’s Discussion of Chalmers’ Zombie Case
4.4.3.2 Williamson’s Interpretation of Gettier’s Ten Coins Case
4.4.3.3 Deutsch’s Interpretation of Kripke’s Gödel-Schmidt Case
4.5 Concluding Remarks
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
