Nowadays, security problems are rarely properly solved or correctly addressed. Electronic security is only part of the chain in making a system secure. Electronic security is usually addressed as network or software security, neglecting other aspects, but the chain is only as strong as its weakest link.
This book is about electronic hardware security, with an emphasis on problems that you can solve on a shoestring DIY budget. It deals mostly with secure communications, cryptosystems, and espionage. You will quickly appreciate that you can’t simply buy a trustworthy and reliable cryptosystem off the shelf. You will then realise that this applies equally to individuals, corporations, and governments.
If you want to increase your electronic security awareness in a world already overcrowded with networks of microphones and cameras, this is a book for you. Furthermore, if you want to do something DIY by designing and expanding upon simple electronic systems, please continue reading. Some of the devices described are already published as projects in the Elektor magazine. Some are still ideas yet to be worked out.
Complexity is the main enemy of security, so we'll try to keep to simple systems. Every chapter will analyse real-life espionage events or at least several hypothetical scenarios that will hopefully spark your imagination. The final goal is to build a security-conscious mindset (or “to get into a head of a spy”) which is necessary to recognise possible threats beforehand, to design a truly secure system.
Author(s): Luka Matic
Publisher: Lektor
Year: 2021
Language: English
Pages: 230
Chapter 1 ● All security problems solved perfectly - or perhaps not?
1.1 ● Popular misconceptions
1.1.1 ● (Mis)understanding the basic principles of security
1.1.2 ● Why design something new?
1.1.3 ● Moore’s law and its corollary on security
1.1.4 ● Espionage in the past and present
1.2 ● Omnipresent, unrecognised, and unaddressed problems
1.2.1 ● Liability problem
1.2.2 ● Failure to recognise important problems to solve
1.2.3 ● Black box problem: Why should I care HOW my super-gizmo gets its work done?
1.2.4 ● Reluctance to properly address the “impossible” scenarios
1.2.5 ● The problems that electronic engineers can’t solve
1.3 ● Low tech rules - very unintuitive
1.4 ● My design philosophy and approach to security
Chapter 2 ● Methods of Attack
2.1 ● Methods to counteract
2.2 ● Mathematical crypto-analysis
2.2.1 ● Brute-force
2.2.2 ● Attacks on RNGs
2.3 ● Buffer-overflow
2.3.1 ● Types of buffer-overflow attacks
2.3.2 ● Von Neumann’s vs. Harvard architecture
2.4 ● Side-channel attacks
2.4.1 ● TEMPEST - a type of side-channel
2.4.2 ● How to defend on a DIY budget?
2.5 ● Hardware Trojans
2.5.1 ● Types of hardware trojan
2.5.2 ● East German Z80 clone vs. the newest 10nm FPGA
2.5.3 ● Planting, detecting, and countermeasures
2.6 ● Exploiting inherently insecure physical properties
2.6.1 ● Deleting HDD and SSD devices
2.6.2 ● Recovering data from old (E)EPROMs
2.6.3 ● SRAM and DRAM data remanence
2.6.4 ● Cold boot attacks
2.6.5 ● What can we do DIY?
Chapter 3 ● Random Number Generators
3.1 ● A good RNG as a necessary link in the security chain
3.1.1 ● Defining specs for a good RNG for use in a crypto system
3.1.2 ● NIST testing
3.1.3 ● Other ways to use NIST RNG tests for security evaluation
3.2 ● Types of RNGs available today and possible problems
3.2.1 ● Pseudo-random numbers generators (PRNG)
3.2.2 ● Highly integrated TRNGs
3.2.3 ● Black-box TRNGs
3.3 ● Elektor TRNG solves some problems, but...
Chapter 4 ● Cryptography on paper, computer, and in the real world
4.1 ● Why do cryptosystems fail?
4.1.1 ● The famous ENIGMA
4.1.2 ● VENONA affair
4.1.3 ● Mathematics is perfect - well almost...
4.1.4 ● Humans are definitely not perfect
4.2 ● More problems and more misconceptions
4.2.1 ● Loose definitions
4.2.1.1 ● Let’s try to define encryption strength...
4.2.1.2 ● What is encryption, and what is not?
4.2.2 ● Symmetric and asymmetric encryption
4.2.3 ● PGP affair
4.2.4 ● Quantum computers
4.2.5 ● Reversing an implication and T-com payphones
4.3 ● Black-box cryptography
4.3.1 ● “Crypto AG” affairs
4.4 ● Elektor OTP Crypto Shield
4.4.1 ● Key distribution problems
4.5 ● Tamper-evident Box solves some problems, but...
Chapter 5 ● A few more cheap and highly secure gadgets
5.1 ● SD card-to-SD card copier
5.2 ● SD card-to-Cassette tape copier
5.3 ● ZMC80 system by Lee Alan Hart
5.3.1 ● Crypto development shield add-on
5.3.2 ● Buffer-overflow protection on hardware level
5.3.3 ● Stack smashing and code obfuscation
5.4 ● Mg-flash analogue memory for Tamper-evident Box
5.5 ● Security by obscurity
5.6 ● MyNOR CPU-less computer by Dennis Kuschel
Chapter 6 ● Hands-on!
6.1 ● TEMPEST attack demos
6.1.1 ● TEMPEST on a dot-matrix printer
6.1.2 ● TEMPEST on a PS/2 or an USB keyboard
6.2 ● Buffer-overflow attack demos
6.2.1 ● Smashing the stack on ZMC- Z80
6.2.2 ● Injecting and executing an arbitrary code
6.3 ● SRAM burnt-in data recovery
6.4 ● Cold-boot attack demo
Chapter 7 ● A few more ideas to work on
7.1 ● SIGSALY-2 “Reloaded”
7.2 ● Microwave oven - an innocuous machine?
7.3 ● “Funcard” system for secure digital signing and decryption
7.4 ● TEMPEST-proof terminal
7.5 ● False Morse signature generator
7.6 ● Encrypted ROMs
7.7 ● Asynchronous computers
7.8 ● DIY device-a supervisor for a “suspicious” commercial device
● Conclusion
● References
● Index
