Are we made entirely of matter, like sticks and stones? Or do we have a soul—a nonphysical entity—where our mental lives take place?
The authors Eric T. Olson and Aaron Segal begin this accessible and wide-ranging debate by looking at the often-overlooked question of whether we appear in ordinary experience to be material things. Olson then argues that the dependence of our mental lives on the condition of our brains—the fact that general anesthesia causes complete unconsciousness, for instance—is best explained by saying that our mental lives are physical activities in our brains rather than nonphysical activities in the soul. Segal objects that this view is incompatible with two obvious and important facts about ourselves: that there is only one of you rather than trillions of almost identical beings now thinking your thoughts, and that we exist and remain conscious for more than an instant. These facts, he claims, are presupposed in our practical and moral judgments—but they require us to be immaterial things. Olson is forced to concede that there is no easy and uncontroversial answer to these objections but doubts whether taking us to be immaterial would be any help. The debate takes in large philosophical questions extending well beyond dualism and materialism.
The book features clear statements of each argument, responses to counter-arguments, in-text definitions, a glossary of key terms, and section summaries. Scholars and students alike will find it easy to follow the debate and learn the key concepts from metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and other areas necessary to understand each position.
Key Features
Is the only introductory book devoted to the debate between substance dualism and materialism
Discusses both traditional and novel arguments for each position
Debates important but infrequently discussed questions, including
do we appear, in ordinary experience, to be material?
should materialism be the default view?
is there a good probabilistic argument for materialism?
Written in a lively and accessible style
Uses only a limited number of technical terms and defines all of them in the glossary
Author(s): Eric T. Olson, Aaron Segal
Series: Little Debates About Big Questions
Publisher: Routledge
Year: 2023
Language: English
Pages: 264
City: New York
Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
Foreword: Dualism and Materialism
Opening Statements
1 Why I Don’t Believe in Souls
1.1 The Question
1.2 Sharpening the Question
1.3 Animals
1.4 Materialism, Immaterialism, and Dualism
1.5 “The Mind”
1.6 Do We Seem to Have a Soul?
1.7 The Argument from Introspection
1.8 Immaterialism and the Imagination
1.9 Could a Material Thing Think?
1.10 The Interaction Problem
1.11 The Duplication Argument
1.12 Emergent Dualism
1.13 The Remote-Control Argument
1.14 Electric Dualism
1.15 Cooperative Dualism
1.16 Mysteries
2 Why I Believe I Am a Soul
2.1 Chili Peppers, Chinchillas, and Chileans
2.2 Is Materialism the Default?
2.3 Matter Is Well Understood (Or Is It?)
2.4 Matter Uncontroversially Exists (Or Does It?)
2.5 The Arguments
2.6 You and Your Body Can Go Their Separate Ways
2.7 Or Can They?
2.8 The Material World Is Inhospitable to Us
2.9 The Argument from Fuzziness
2.10 What Goes for One Goofy Goes for All
2.11 Who Says There Aren’t Vastly Many Conscious Beings in My Chair?
2.12 Might I Be Vague?
2.13 It Won’t Help If I’m Vague
2.14 Argument from Fuzziness: Taking Stock
2.15 Argument from Flux
2.16 Nothing Can Gain or Lose Parts
2.17 Conclusion
First Round of Replies
3 Fuzzy Edges and Amputations
3.1 Aaron’s Antimaterialist Arguments
3.2 The Fuzziness Argument
3.3 The Atomic Composition Principle
3.4 The Neat-and-Tidy Picture
3.5 Crowded Materialism
3.6 The Rough-and-Messy Picture
3.7 Why the Fuzziness Argument Doesn’t Support Immaterialism
3.8 The Flux Argument
3.9 The Amputation Paradox
3.10 Heraclitean Materialism and the Rough-and-Messy Picture Again
3.11 Why the Flux Argument Doesn’t Support Immaterialism
4 A Sane Soul-Hypothesis and the Sane Materialist Alternative
4.1 Where We Part Ways
4.2 The Appearances
4.3 Faux-Mentality
4.4 Materialism Is No Better Off
4.5 Creation Ex Nihilo?
4.6 Who’s Doing the Thinking?
4.7 Surplus Mysteries?
4.8 Physicalism and Idealism
Second Round of Replies
5 The Appearances and the Evidence
5.1 Appearances One More Time
5.2 Souls, Zombies, and Wotsits
5.3 Materialism and Property Dualism
5.4 Is Immaterialism Unfalsifiable?
6 Materialism Is Metaphysically Messy or Morally Absurd
6.1 Laying Out the Materialist Strategies
6.2 Learn to Get along with Others
6.3 Learn to Live in the Moment
6.4 Rough-and-Messy Materialism
6.5 Is Immaterialism in the Same Boat?
Glossary
Further Readings
Bibliography
Index
