Conditionals: Logic, Linguistics and Psychology

Contents
List of Contributors
List of Figures
List of Tables
Introduction
References
Conditionals, Indeterminacy, Probability and Truth
1 Introduction
2 Indeterminacy
3 The Transition From the Indicative to the Counterfactual
4 Stalnaker’s Truth Conditions
5 Bradley’s Amendments
6 Bradley’s Theory
7 Truth Conditions
8 Compounds of Conditionals
9 Concluding Remarks
References
Gibbardian Collapse and Trivalent Conditionals
1 Introduction
2 Gibbard’s Collapse Result
3 The Trivalent Analysis of Indicative Conditionals
4 Gibbardian Collapse in DF/TT and CC/TT
5 Gibbardian Collapse in QCC/TT
6 Fitelson’s Generalized Collapse Result
7 Fitelson’s Result and Trivalent Logic
8 Blocking Fitelson’s Collapse Strongly and Weakly
9 Conclusion
Appendices
Appendix A: Import-Export Revisited
Appendix B: Proofs
Appendix C: Gibbardian Collapse Without Left Logical Equivalence
References
The Logic and Pragmatics of Conditionals Under Uncertainty: A Mental Probability Logic Perspective
1 Introduction
2 Method
2.1 Participants and Procedure
2.2 Method
2.3 Results
3 Concluding Remarks
References
Rethinking the Acceptability and Probability of Indicative Conditionals
1 Introduction
2 Empirical Support
3 Theoretical Arguments
3.1 Ramsey Test
3.2 Triviality Proofs
3.3 Truth Conditions and Probability
3.4 Probability and Acceptability
4 Conclusion
References
Indicative and Counterfactual Conditionals in the Psychology of Reasoning
1 Introduction
2 The Rerunning History Hypothesis
3 Lewis’ Dialogue Technique and MP
4 The New Bayesian Paradigm in the Psychology of Reasoning
5 Conditionals and Relations
6 The Probability Conditional and Inference
7 Bayesian Networks
8 Concluding Remarks on Truth
References
Inferentialism: A Manifesto
1 Inferentialism
2 Evidence for Inferentialism
2.1 Soritical Series and Inference Strength
2.2 Modus Ponens and Inference Strength
2.3 Probabilities of Conditionals
2.4 Similarity-Based Arguments
3 Objections and Replies
3.1 Inferentialism Is Incomplete
3.2 Inferentialism Is Too Narrow
3.3 Inferentialism Is Implausible
3.4 Inferentialism Is Unfalsifiable
4 Conclusion
References
Independence Conditionals
References
Experimenting with (Conditional) Perfection: Tests of the Exhaustivity Theory
1 Introduction
2 From Implicatures to Exhaustivity
3 Designing Experimental Tests of Perfection Inferences
4 The Sequence of Experiments
5 Theoretical Discussion
5.1 Relation to a Prior Experiment
5.2 How the Experiments Constrain Explanations of Perfection
5.2.1 Do People Infer Perfected Conditionals from Exhaustive Answers?
5.2.2 Why don’t People Believe Conditional Answers to Questions Are Exhaustive?
References
The External Syntax of Conditional Clauses
1 Introduction
1.1 Main Goals and Outline of the Chapter
1.2 Starting Point: Two Types of Conditional Clauses: Event Structuring vs. Discourse Structuring
2 Differentiating Between the Two Types of Conditionals: Diagnostics
2.1 Coordination of Likes
2.2 Scope Phenomena
2.2.1 Temporal and Modal Subordination
2.2.2 Negation
2.2.3 Focus
2.3 VP Ellipsis and VP Anaphora
2.4 Embedding of the Conditional Clause with the Associated Clause
2.5 Verb Second
3 The External Syntax of Factual Conditionals and Judgement Phrase
3.1 Epistemic Modals
3.2 Layers of Structure: Krifka (2017; to Appear), Frey (2020)
3.3 Against an Orphan Account for Factual Conditionals
4 Speech-Event Modifiers as Syntactic Orphans
4.1 A Third Type of Adverbial Clause
4.2 Scope Effects and Speech-Event Modifiers
4.3 Re-Evaluating the Analyses
4.3.1 Coordination
4.3.2 Then Resumption (Takami 1988: 271f.)
4.3.3 Non-Veridicality
4.3.4 Embeddability
4.3.5 Verb Second
4.3.6 Summary
4.4 A Ternary Typology
4.4.1 Peripheral Adverbial Clauses vs. Non-Integrated Adverbial Clauses
4.4.2 PAC vs. NiC: Some Problematic Cases
4.4.3 Speculations on the Ternary Typology
5 Summary
References
Toward a Unified Linguistic Approach to Conditionals—Some Empirical Evidence
1 Introduction
2 The Conditional Construct and Its Syntax
3 Clause Order and Clause Marker
3.1 Markers of Protasis and Apodosis
3.1.1 Class I: Overtly and Obligatorily Marked P + Overtly and Obligatorily Marked Q
3.1.2 Class II: Overtly and Obligatorily Marked P + Overtly But Not Obligatorily Marked Q (The dubious nature of the English ‘then’)
3.1.3 Class III: Overtly but Not Obligatorily Marked P + Overtly and Obligatorily Marked Q (The Supposed Hindi Apodosis Marker to)
3.1.4 Class IV: Overtly but Not Obligatorily Marked P + Overtly but Not Obligatorily Marked Q
3.1.5 Class V: Protasis Marked through a Special Morphological Form of the Verb + Apodosis Remaining Unmarked
3.2 Summary
3.3 The Link between P and Q
4 Time Reference in Conditionals
5 Degrees of Hypotheticality
5.1 Types of Speaker’s Epistemic Stances in Factual Expressions
5.2 Types of Speaker’s Epistemic Stance in Conditionals
5.2.1 Conditional Type 1 (The Lowest Degree of Hypotheticality)
5.2.2 Conditional Type 2 (The Highest Degree of Hypotheticality)
6 Conclusion
References
Should Past-as-Modal Theorists Also Be Past-as-Past Theorists?
1 Introduction
2 One-Past and Two-Past
3 One-Past Forms in Past-Oriented Narratives
4 Explaining the Availability of These Forms
5 The Difficulty in Accommodating Reference Times
6 Towards a Two-Readings Theory
7 Conclusion
References
How Fake Is Fake Past?
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Time and Modality
2.2 Tense and the Modal ’woll’
3 Indicative Conditionals
3.1 Temporal Perspective
3.2 Scheduling Antecedents
3.3 Truth Conditions
3.4 Related Work
4 “Fake” Past and “Subjunctive” Conditionals
4.1 Expanding the Modal Background
4.2 Two Types of Subjunctives
4.3 Time of Intervention
4.4 Time of Intervention and Temporal Perspective
4.5 Temporal Past Without Intervention
5 Conclusions
References
Counterfactual Hypothetical vs. Biscuit Conditionals: A Semantic/Pragmatic Analysis of Their Morphological Differences
1 Introduction
2 Background on Tense and Mood
2.1 Tense and Sequence of Tense
2.2 Subjunctive Mood
2.3 Breaking Sequence of Tense
3 Proposal
3.1 Grammatical Hypothetical Counterfactuals
3.2 Grammatical Biscuit Counterfactuals
3.3 Unacceptable Biscuit Counterfactuals
3.4 Unacceptable Hypothetical Counterfactuals
4 Outlook
References
Events Are the Source of Causal Readings in the Simplest English Conditionals
1 A Causal Puzzle About Statives and Eventives in Conditionals
1.1 Causation Rather Than Time
1.2 Compositionality and the Stative–Eventive Distinction
1.3 Do Will Not Do
1.4 How We Will Solve the Puzzle
2 True Eventives Are a Different Type Than Statives
2.1 Tests for Eventivity vs. Stativity
2.2 Some Apparent “Eventives” in English Are Actually Stative
2.3 True Eventives Are Not Assertable
2.4 Assertability Has to Do with Type
3 True Eventives Are Relational
4 Solving the Puzzle
4.1 Causal Models with Indexed Situations
4.2 Denotations of Verbal Predicates
4.3 If
4.4 Putting It All Together
4.5 Related Examples
References
Index