This book aims at providing cases with inspiring findings for global researchers in capacity allocation and reservation. Capacity allocation mechanisms are introduced in the book, as well as the measures to build models and the ways to achieve supply chain coordination. In addition, it illustrates the capacity reservation contract and quantity flexible contract with comparisons and some numerical studies. The book is divided into 7 chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the background and the latest development of the research. Chapter 2 introduces how to manage downstream competition through capacity allocation in symmetric market, including proportional mechanism and lexicographic mechanism. Demand competition is introduced in Chapter 3 as well as the uniform allocation mechanism and the comparisons among three different mechanisms. In Chapter 4, we give information about demand competition with fixed factor allocation, and the comparison with other allocations. Chapter 5 provides the optimal strategies under fixed allocation with multiple retailers and the impacts of fixed proportions. Chapter 6 illustrates how to achieve supply chain coordination through capacity reservation contract and its comparison with the quantity flexibility contract, and in Chapter 7 we describe outsourcing decisions and order policies in different systems with some numerical studies. We sincerely hope that this book can provide some useful suggestions and inspirations for scholars around the world who have the same interests in this field.
Author(s): Jianbin Li, Xueyuan Cai, Binbin Li
Series: Uncertainty and Operations Research
Publisher: Springer
Year: 2022
Language: English
Pages: 257
City: Singapore
Contents
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
1.2 State of Research
1.3 Option/Reservation Contract
1.4 Commitment Contract
References
2 Managing Downstream Competition via Capacity Allocation in Symmetric Market
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Model Formulation
2.3 Proportional Allocation Mechanism
2.3.1 Retailers' Game
2.3.2 Optimal Wholesale Price
2.4 Lexicographic Allocation Mechanism
2.4.1 Retailers' Game
2.4.2 Optimal Wholesale Price
2.5 Comparisons
2.6 The Case with Multiple Retailers
2.6.1 Proportional Versus Lexicographic Mechanisms Under Multiple Retailers
2.6.2 Nonlinear Wholesale Price
2.7 Concluding Remarks
References
3 Capacity Allocation with Demand Competition in Asymmetric Market
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Model Formulation
3.3 Uniform Allocation Mechanism
3.3.1 Equilibrium Analysis Under Uniform Allocation
3.3.2 Supplier's Decisions Under Uniform Allocation
3.4 Proportional and Lexicographic Allocation Mechanisms
3.5 Comparison of Three Mechanisms
3.6 An Arbitrary Number of Retailers
3.7 Concluding Remarks
References
4 Allocating Capacity with Demand Competition: Fixed Factor Allocation
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Model Description
4.3 Retailers' Decisions
4.3.1 Retailer 1's Best Response Function
4.3.2 Retailer 2's Best Response Function
4.3.3 Nash Equilibrium
4.4 Supplier's Decision
4.5 Impacts of Fixed Factor α
4.6 Comparison with Centralized Supply Chain
4.7 Comparison with Other Allocations
4.8 Optimal Capacity Choice
4.9 Concluding Remarks
References
5 Fixed Allocation of Capacity for Multiple Retailers Under Demand Competition
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Model Description
5.3 Optimal Strategies Under Fixed Allocation
5.3.1 Nash Equilibrium
5.3.2 Supplier's Decision
5.4 Impacts of Fixed Proportions
5.5 Comparison with Proportional Allocation
5.6 Comparison with Centralized Supply Chain
5.7 Extension: Case with Retailers' Capacity Hoarding
5.8 Concluding Remarks
References
6 Supply Chain Coordination Through Capacity Reservation Contract and Quantity Flexibility Contract
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Model Setting
6.3 Capacity Reservation Contract
6.3.1 Construction Decision of Manufacturer
6.3.2 Reservation Decision of Retailer
6.3.3 The Benefit of the Capacity Reservation Contract
6.3.4 Design Parameters for Channel Coordination
6.4 Quantity Flexibility Contract
6.4.1 Construction Decision of Manufacturer
6.4.2 Reservation Decision of Retailer
6.4.3 The Benefit of the Quantity Flexibility Contract
6.4.4 Design Parameters for Channel Coordination
6.5 Comparison Between Quantity Flexibility Contact and Capacity Reservation Contract
6.5.1 Comparison Without Coordination
6.5.2 Profit Distribution Under Coordination
6.6 Extension
6.6.1 Negotiation for Setting Contract Parameters
6.6.2 Correlation Between Demand and Retail Price
6.7 Concluding Remarks
References
7 Outsourcing Decision and Order Policy with Forecast Updating Under Capacity Reservation Contract
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Model Formulation
7.3 Centralized System
7.4 Decentralized System
7.4.1 Retailer's Optimal Decision
7.4.2 Optimal Strategy for the Supplier
7.5 Numerical Studies
7.5.1 Analysis of Players' Strategies
7.6 Concluding Remarks
References
