Author(s): Ariel Rubinstein
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Year: 1990
Language: English
Pages: 234
Preface
1. Introduction
1.1 Some Basic Terms
1.2 Outline of the Book
Notes
Part 1. Bargaining Theory
2. The Axiomatic Approach: Nash's Solution
2.1 Bargaining Problems
2.2 Nash's Axioms
2.3 Nash's Theorem
2.4 Applications
2.5 Is Any Axiom Superfluous?
2.6 Extensions of the Theory
Notes
3. The Strategic Approach: A Model of Alternating Offers
3.1 The Strategic Approach
3.2 The Structure of Bargaining
3.3 Preferences
3.4 Strategies
3.5 Strategies as Automata
3.6 Nash Equilibrium
3.7 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
3.8 The Main Result
3.9 Examples
3.10 Properties of the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
3.11 Finite versus Infinite Horizons
3.12 Models in Which Players Have Outside Options
3.13 A Game of Alternating Offers with Three Bargainers
Notes
4. The Relation between the Axiomatic and Strategic Approaches
4.1 Introduction
4.2 A Model of Alternating Offers with a Risk of Breakdown
4.3 A Model of Simultaneous Offers: Nash's ``Demand Game''
4.4 Time Preference
4.5 A Model with Both Time Preference and Risk of Breakdown
4.6 A Guide to Applications
Notes
5. A Strategic Model of Bargaining between Incompletely Informed Players
5.1 Introduction
5.2 A Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers
5.3 Sequential Equilibrium
5.4 Delay in Reaching Agreement
5.5 A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium
5.6 Mechanism Design
Notes
Part 2. Models of Decentralized Trade
6. A First Approach Using the Nash Solution
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Two Basic Models
6.3 Analysis of Model A (A Market in Steady State)
6.4 Analysis of Model B (Simultaneous Entry of All Sellers and Buyers)
6.5 A Limitation of Modeling Markets Using the Nash Solution
6.6 Market Entry
6.7 A Comparison of the Competitive Equilibrium with the Market Equilibria in Models A and B
Notes
7. Strategic Bargaining in a Steady State Market
7.1 Introduction
7.2 The Model
7.3 Market Equilibrium
7.4 Analysis of Market Equilibrium
7.5 Market Equilibrium and Competitive Equilibrium
Notes
8. Strategic Bargaining in a Market with One-Time Entry
8.1 Introduction
8.2 A Market in Which There Is a Single Indivisible Good
8.3 Market Equilibrium
8.4 A Market in Which There Are Many Divisible Goods
8.5 Market Equilibrium
8.6 Characterization of Market Equilibrium
8.7 Existence of a Market Equilibrium
8.8 Market Equilibrium and Competitive Equilibrium
Notes
9. The Role of the Trading Procedure
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Random Matching
9.3 A Model of Public Price Announcements
9.4 Models with Choice of Partner
9.5 A Model with More General Contracts and Resale
Notes
10. The Role of Anonymity
10.1 Introduction
10.2 The Model
10.3 Market Equilibrium
10.4 The No-Discount Assumption
10.5 Market Equilibrium and Competitive Equilibrium
Notes
References
Index
