This book is a primer on economics of competition law by a Commissioner based on cases of the Competition Commission of India (CCI). It presents economic theories in lucid ways while providing an in depth economic analysis of the cases dealt by CCI and in the process, it blends the diversity of responses by including the orders upheld by majority and minority. In essence. It is a unique work that addresses the gap between competition law and economics.
Author(s): Geeta Gouri
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
Year: 2023
Language: English
Pages: 257
City: Singapore
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Regulation and Competition
1 Regulation or a Regulated Controlled Economy
2 Distinctions in Regulation
3 Regulation and Competition—in the Market for the Market
4 Raghavan Committee Report
5 Emergent Markets and Competition
5.1 Platform Markets
5.2 Data Markets
5.3 Market for Ideas
6 Conclusions
Notes
References
2 Basics of Economics of Competition and Markets in Product Markets
1 Product Market
1.1 Objective of Competition Policy
1.2 Monopolistic Competition/Duopoly
2 Economics of Antitrust Abuses Listed in the Competition Act
2.1 Section 3 Abuses—Abuse of Agreements
2.2 Sections 4 and 5& 6—Unilateral and Coordinated Effects
2.3 Limitations of the Product Market
3 Conclusion
Notes
References
3 Economics of Emergent Markets Platform Markets, Data Markets and Market for Ideas
1 Platform Markets
1.1 Platform Economics
1.2 Platforms and Shifting Terrains of Antitrust Abuse
1.3 Whither Competition
2 Data Markets
2.1 Data Markets
2.2 Pricing of a Quasi-Public Good
3 Market for Ideas—Intellectual Property Rights16
3.1 Institutional Structure of SEPs
3.2 Royalty Rates and Market Creation
3.3 Standard Setting Organizations (SSO)
4 Conclusions
Notes
References
4 Economic Analysis of Horizontal Agreements and Vertical Agreements (Section 3)
1 Section I: Cartels, Collusion and Horizontal Agreements
1.1 Setting Standards for Cartels
1.1.1 Criterion for Defining Cartel
1.1.2 Information, Penalties and Cartels
1.2 Case Analysis-Ex Post
1.2.1 Analysis of the Decision
1.2.2 Game Theoretic Model and Trigger Mechanisms37
1.2.3 Resetting Standards
1.2.4 History of CCI and the Association(s)
1.2.5 Structure of Onion Market
1.2.6 Onion Markets
1.2.7 Auctions and Cartels in Onion Markets
1.2.8 Qua Maghribi Traders
1.2.9 Legal and Procedural Framework
1.2.10 Conclusion
2 Section II: Vertical Agreements and Restraints for Enhancing Efficiency
2.1 Setting Standards in Vertical Agreements
2.1.1 Defining the Vertical Relationship
2.2 Analysis of Cases of Vertical Agreements
2.2.1 The Automotive Spare Parts
2.2.2 Background
2.2.3 The Market Defined
2.2.4 Investigation
2.2.5 Case Analysis
2.2.6 Economics of Cross-Elasticities of Pricing
2.2.7 Access to Service Centers
2.2.8 Rethink
2.2.9 Resale Price Maintenance—the continuing story
2.2.10 Double Marginalization and RPM
2.2.11 Tie-In Arrangement
2.2.12 Vertical Arrangements in Hospitals‒Harvesting Stem Cell
3 Conclusion
Notes
References
5 Dynamics of Competition: Dominance, Platforms and Antitrust Abuse
1 Case Analysis of Product Markets
1.1 Real Estate and Services of Builders: Steps in Assessing Anti-competitiveness: Unfair or Discriminatory Conditions and Pricing
1.1.1 Defining the Relevant Market
1.1.2 Dominance and Its Abuse
1.2 Springer India: Insignificance of Defining Geographic Market qua Relevant Market Definition
1.3 BCCI: Conundrums of an Administrator Rolled into a Regulator: Anti-competitive in Conflict of Interest
1.3.1 Parameters for Competition Assessment
1.3.2 Rights and Rewards
1.4 Long-Term Supply Agreement: Jindal Steel v Steel Authority of India
2 What We Understood and What We Missed: Beginnings of Platform Market
2.1 The Learning Process
2.2 MCX-SX v NSE: Predatory and Leveraging in a Nascent Platform Market
2.2.1 Economics of Predatory Pricing and Leveraging
2.2.2 Relevant Market
2.2.3 ‘What We Understood and What We Missed’
2.3 Matrimony.com v Google India‒Protecting Competition Versus Protecting Competitors
2.3.1 The Relevant Market
2.3.2 Dominance Assessed
2.3.3 ‘What We Understood and What We Missed’
3 Conclusion
Notes
References
6 Economic Analysis of Combinations Mergers, Amalgamations and Acquisitions
1 Framework of Analysis of Combinations
2 Regulations
2.1 Forms‒Group and Control
2.2 Regulations of Significance
3 Cases of Combinations from an Economics Perspective
3.1 Mergers Pre-Platform Markets
3.1.1 Drugs and Pharmaceutical Sector
3.1.2 Clearance with Failure to Notify
3.1.3 Mergers‒Platform Market
4 Conclusions
Notes
References
7 Interface Between Competition Commission of India and Sectoral Regulators
1 Drawing the Boundaries
1.1 Brief Overview of Legal Provisions1
1.1.1 Electricity Act
1.1.2 TRAI Act
1.1.3 Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006
2 Private Enforcement and Damages
2.1 Rethink over Sectoral Regulators
3 Overlapping’s of Jurisdictions: Commissions Approach
3.1 Electricity Sector
3.2 Telecom Sector and TRAI
3.3 Gatekeepers and Platform Markets
3.4 Petroleum and Natural Gas Board
4 Suggested Future Actions
5 Conclusion
Notes
References
8 Conclusions: Challenges for Competition Policy and Law
1 Privacy and Competition
2 Agenda of Inclusive Growth
2.1 Unfair Contracts
2.2 Gender and Migrant Labor
3 Conclusion
Notes
References
Index
